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Historically, Scotland has struggled against internal
turmoil as well as having struggled to maintain its
autonomy. The Union of 1707 was a political movement which
brought economic prosperity to the elites and economic
devastation to the working class of Scotland. Consequently,
without political support from the larger parties in
Scotland, devolutionists were unable to establish any form
of local government other than the Scottish Office.
Attempts were made by home rule advocates to organize
formally, but none were as successful as the Scottish
National Party (SNP). As economic conditions declined, and
oil was found in the North Sea, the SNP gained some
credibility and threatened the position of the most powerful
party in Scotland, the Labour Party. The Labour Party
realized that it must deter the SNP's growing popularity by
working for devolution.
Economics and nationalism were significant factors in
raising Scottish political consciousness, but were unable to
bring about successful devolution. Problems within prodevolution parties as well as between these parties held
back the devolution plan drafting process.
The passage of the Scottish Devolution Referendum in 1997
was due to the efforts of the Labour Party under the
leadership of Tony Blair. Blair recognized the domestic and
political advantages of Scotland having its own parliament.
As a result, he used devolution as one of his key party
issues on his 1997 platforms. Blair quelled the
fractionalization of the Labour Party which had been a
primary reason for devolution referendum failure in 1979.
He harnessed Scotland's economic discontent and rising
nationalism to draft successfully and pass the 1997
devolution referendum.
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PREFACE
During my junior year abroad in Scotland, I became
aware of the differences in Scottish culture compared to
that of British culture so heavily influenced by England.
Like most Americans, I was completely ignorant of the
differences between two distinct cultures, the Anglo-Norman
English and the Celtic Scots, existing on one island and of
the tension existing between them.
The Scots were dissatisfied with their representation
in the British Parliament, as well as with the gradual
stripping of their identity from them for the past two
hundred and ninety years by the English.

My friends from

both sides of the border were more than willing to discuss
the political, social, and economic tensions between England
and Scotland.

It was during this time that one friend

declared that Scotland was going to have its own parliament
before the beginning of the next decade.

The first thought

that came to mind was, "Is Nicola a Scottish Nationalist?"
No, she was not a nationalist, for she did not want to cut
all ties with England.

Nic, like the majority of the
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Scottish population, believed that Scotland should have more
control over Scotland's affairs, and it was only a matter of
time before devolution became a reality.
The right time and political arena for devolution was
in 1997 when the Labour Party won the election.

Having

firmly committed themselves to devolution when they brought
it to the forefront of its campaign platform. Labour wasted
no time in producing a devolution plan.

The plan was met

with approval by the majority of the Labour Party and the
Liberal Party, as well as a considerable portion of the
Scottish Nationalist Party.

The result of these efforts was

the successful passage of the Scottish Devolution referendum
on September 12, 1997, and a topic for my thesis.
Devolution is a complex development influenced by
economics and nationalism.

However, until the political

mechanisms, meaning dominant political parties and political
elites, harness these two components, devolution cannot
occur.

More specifically, without the efforts of the Labour

Party, the devolution referendum would not have passed in
1997.
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GLOSSARY

The Act of Union (1707). The disintegration of the
Scottish Parliament and the joining of Scotland with
England to create the Parliament of Great Britain.
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA). Devolutionists
formed this group specifically to create a directly
elected legislative assembly for Scotland.
The Celts. The people originally populating Scotland.
These people were barbarians who had their
own distinct language, culture, and religion.
Conservative Party. The political party most
consistently opposed to devolution and all it entails.
The Conservative party is the party located on the
right side of the political party spectrum.
Devolution. The transfer of specific powers of the
central government to directly elected subordinate
bodies.
European Union
An organization that European countries
join in order to work towards economic stability and
trade advantages.
Gaelic. Language spoken by the Celts in Scotland and in
Ireland.
Irish Republican Army (IRA). The radical division of
Irish nationalists who use violence in their fight for
the unification of Northern Ireland and Ireland.
The Jacobites. Scots who fought for the return of the
Royal Stuarts to the Scottish and English throne.
Though mostly Highlanders, this group also included
Catholics and Scottish Lowlanders who remained loyal to
"Bonnie Prince Charlie" (Charles Stuart).
Scottish Labour Party. The political party in Scotland
responsible for the occurrence of devolution. Its
counterpart in England is the British Labour Party
vii

which gave the Scottish Labour the support and
leadership necessary for devolution to occur.
Scottish dialect. The accent, rhythm, and pronunciation of
words in the English language, as well as slang and
word use of the Scots. It is distinctly different than
the dialect spoken by the English, being softer, with
the words slurred together.
Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). The political party who
has working diligently towards separation from the
United Kingdom. Some of its members favor devolution
because it is popular with the majority of Scots and
can be more easily realized than separation.
The Scottish Office. A form of ruling body created in the
1920's which is granted limited power to resolve
domestic political, economic, and social issues in
Scotland.
Sein Fenn. The organization of Irish nationalists who
peacefully work towards resolving tension and violence
between Ireland and Northern Ireland.

CHAPTER I
DEVOLUTION IN SCOTLAND:

AN INTRODUCTION

Devolution is defined as the transfer of specific
powers of the central government to directly elected
subordinate bodies.

Not to be confused with federalism,

devolution is the process by which the central government
transfers some specific powers without relinquishing its
supremacy.^ Devolution, therefore, allows local governments
to have more control over their domestic affairs.

Theorists

contend that devolution is a natural result of social
tension, economic change, and political evolution.

Whether

devolution has been occurring as a result of political
manipulation of nationalism or economics, or to preserve
unitary governments, it has been occurring all over the
world.

The revival of nationalism and economic development

in countries has caused political upheaval, and devolution
is the solution to instability and decline.^
The focus of this thesis is the Labour Party's key role
in the success of devolution in Scotland through examining
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Scotland's 290 year struggle for its own parliament.^

The

historical role of Scotland's economic instability and
nationalism was significant in bringing about devolution in
Scotland.

However, politics played the key role in the

transition, utilizing the economic and nationalist movements
to achieve devolution.

Without the cohesion of the Labour

Party and its leadership, the vote for devolution would not
have passed.
A comparison between the economic and social conditions
of 1979 and 1997 illustrates that there is very little
difference between them.

In both 1979 and 1997 there was

high unemployment, a lack of attention paid to Scotland's
domestic affairs, and a very strong nationalist movement in
existence.

The difference between 1979 and 1997 is the

organization and cohesiveness of the Labour Party.

Through

Tony Blair's leadership, the organization and focus of the
Labour Party changed.

Realigning the intent and purpose of

the Party by focusing on issues which would lead to an
electoral victory compelled Labour to take devolution
seriously.^

3

The 1979 Labour Party was split over devolution.
Internal factions existing within factions made it difficult
for party leadership to formulate a reasonable plan for
devolution.

In addition to internal factionalization.

Labour's poor relationship with the Liberal Party and
intense competition with the Scottish Nationalist Party made
agreeing upon a devolution plan an almost impossible task.
However, Blair's efforts to change the Labour Party to
insure electoral success, as well as better to meet the
domestic needs of the Scots, were the impetus for
devolution.^
Devolution was an inevitable political movement in
Scotland.

It was essential for the effective resolution of

domestic affairs, as well as a strategic move for the Labour
Party.

Devolution has occurred in Scotland, but it is not

alone in political evolution.

Countries in Western and

Eastern Europe, North i\merica, Asia, and South America are
all devolving for the same reasons as Scotland, as well as
for other reasons®.
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Devolution Worldwide

Devolution is occurring worldwide for the same reasons
it is transpiring in Scotland: political groups harnessing
economic and nationalist movements to establish their own
ruling body.

Theorists argue that Scotland needs to have

its own ruling body to resolve successfully its economic
problems.

However, another reason which is not central to

this thesis, but nonetheless used as a counter argument for
separatism's association with devolution, is that it is
necessary to preserve the state.

These theorists posit that

devolution is essential for the preservation of the United
Kingdom, and it has also become essential in preventing the
disintegration of governments in other countries.^
Countries which have devolved governments include
Spain, former countries of the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka,
Canada, New Zealand, Italy, and Mexico.®

These countries

have faced the reality that they must devolve in order to
resolve issues of nationalism, economic development, and
political differences.

In countries such as Scotland, there

have been protests, strikes, and rallies in which Scots have
protested against the ineffectiveness of the British
Parliament and to show their support for devolution.®
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However, in other countries, such as the ones in the former
Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Spain, and Italy, devolution has
not only become necessary for unity, but also to stop
violent acts of war from occurring or continuing.^"
Sri Lanka's colonial legacy has left it with a highly
centralized political and administrative system.

This

strong tradition of a powerful centralized government has
caused political discord among the three different ethnic
sects in the country.

Their religious and social

differences, as well as economic jealousies, have created
problems among these groups for hundreds of years.
The Sinhala Maha Sabha, the Tamil Congress, and the
Musliui League have been violently feuding for a great period
of time.

The Sinhalese, the largest ethnic group in Sri

Lanka, have the majority of power.

They are unwilling to

extend any of the considerable power they enjoy at the
national level to people outside of their immediate circle.
The Sinhalese ignore the Tamil's political and cultural
demands.

They refuse to work out language differences, to

work on land development, or to address the needs for
regions or districts brought to the attention of the Prime
ministers by local authorities.^^
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Until recently, the Unitarian Sinhalese government has
also refused to devolve adequate powers from the center to
regions inhabited by the Tamils.

Violent acts and Tamils'

threats of separation from Sri Lanka have forced the
Sinhalese to acknowledge the need for devolved power.

The

purpose of devolution is to ease Tamil alienation and keep
intact a single nation through transferring power to local
governments.

Yet, at this point in the devolution process,

several plans for power distribution have been rejected.
Suggestions have included allowing the Ceylon Tamils more
involvement in the economy, politics, and infrastructure of
their society.

As this transformation occurs, Sri Lanka

will not only be preserving its central governm.ent, but it
will also prosper.
While Sri Lanka's need for devolution is based on
nationalism, the devolution occurring in the former Soviet
Union is based on both nationalism and economics, but with
more emphasis placed on economics than nationalism.
Countries such as Chechnya and Tatarstan have experienced
devastating violence because of ethnic and economic
inequality.
devolution.

The resolution of this devastating violence is
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Avoiding the emotionally charged rhetoric of selfdetermination and of Tatarstan's nationalist and historical
claims to sovereignty, their leaders have instead used their
vast oil resources and their industrial base as levers to
secure political and economic concessions from Moscow.
Consequently, wealthy republics secure greater rights and
privileges than their poorer neighbors, and these greater
rights and privileges may destabilize the federation.
However, the very concept of devolving power and allowing
its republics more authority over its domestic affairs is a
step in the right direction if peace and unity are to be
maintained.

Devolution of power is one of the best tools at

the central government's disposal to preserve its
territorial integrity and ensure political stability in the
medium and the long term.^^

Scotland's Historical, Nationalist and Economic Claim for
Devolved Power

The concept of devolved power has existed in Scotland
since its aristocrats and rich elites gave Scotland to
England to form the United Kingdom.

Devolved power is not

complete separation from the United Kingdom.

Devolving

power would allow Scotland to be an equal to England's
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status in the United Kingdom rather than continue its
current status as a the weaker member in the United Kingdom.
Though initially promised a partnership rather than a
province-within-a-state relationship, Scotland soon found
itself subservient to England.

As a result, the Scots first

voiced weakly their need for more power over their own
domestic affairs.

As their confidence in their right to

their own ruling body became stronger, Scotland's political,
economic, and national voices became stronger.
The Scots united with England in 1707, giving up their
right to full control over their domestic affairs in
exchange for an equal economic and political partnership in
the United Kingdom.

Even with the unequal power

relationship, they managed to retain a separate and distinct
identity from the English.

Their speech, mannerisms,

religion, literature, and culture differ significantly from
the English.

This retention of tradition and culture has

long been a source of conflict between the two nations, with
the English wanting the Scots to conform to their cultural
identity.
The Scots have resisted, keeping their own education
system.

Their education system has long been considered by
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other European countries to be superior to that of the
English system, having educated numerous famous writers,
theorists, scientists, and inventors.

The Scots have also

been able to maintain their own legal system, as well as a
separate religion."

Nationalism has played a distinctive

role in keeping the concept of devolution alive until it
became a reality in September 1997.

However, nationalism

was not the deciding factor, nor was it the only factor.
Economics has played a key role in the campaign for
devolution.

In the beginning of the Union, the aristocrats

and the Scottish elites were aware of the economic
advantages they would gain from the unification of Scotland
with England.

A union would bring Scotland a share in the

British East India Company, the English Colonies, the
English System of Navigation Acts and mercantilism.

These

advantages were truly such for those Scots who were already
affluent and had the money to invest in these endeavors.
However, the average Scot, who was most likely a farmer
eking out a living from the land, did not benefit from these
advantages.
Industrialization of Scotland brought greater
prosperity to more Scots, lasting until the mid-1950's when
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Scotland experienced economic distress.

Between 1954 and

1967, 90,000 Scots lost their jobs because the old, heavyindustry of the previous and earlier part of the century had
declined.

Employment, which had once been found in

shipbuilding, coal mining, and railways, was no longer to be
found.''
As Scotland headed into the next decade, the Scots were
no longer willing to experience passively a greater decline
in their economic state.

Consequently, when oil was

discovered in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland, the
Scots immediately claimed it as theirs, and resented sharing
any of the income accrued from it with England.

Yet, even

the rush of econom.ic vitality was singularly incapable of
bringing about devolution.
Nationalism and economics alone were not enough to
bring about devolution.

Yet, when combined and manipulated

by politics, these two movements played a significant role
in devolution.

Consequently, the political machine in

Scotland brought about devolution just as it brought about
the Union of 1707. The Union of 1707 was a political move
based on the desires of the Scottish elites and aristocrats.
This decision would have a significant impact on the socio
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economic conditions in Scotland, benefiting the affluent
rather than the masses.

The British Parliament soon

recognized these poor conditions and reacted by establishing
the Scottish Office in 1885 to handle the domestic affairs
of Scotland."
The Scottish Office received the minimum amount of
authority the British Parliament believed was necessary to
meet the needs of the Scots.

However, as social and

economic problems changed or increased, the British
Parliament was compelled to give it more power to resolve
these problems.

The Scottish Office used the increased

pov/er to the best of its ability, but their efforts were
often fruitless, such as the tim.e period between 1954-1967,
when over 90,000 Scots lost their jobs.

The compilation of

bad housing, high unemployment, and low wages compelled the
Scots to act instead of remaining passive.

The action taken

was a revival of nationalism by the Scottish National Party
(SNP)
This radical nationalist group called for the complete
separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, basing their
party platform on Scotland's weakened economic, social, and
political conditions.The Scottish National Party, which

12

before this time had very little credibility, began to win
seats in the Parliament.

The Scottish Labour Party, which

had been the strongest party representing Scotland in the
British Parliament, felt threatened by the Scottish
Nationalists, and were compelled by Prime Minister Harold
Wilson's government to take up the fight for devolution.^®
Home rule has consistently constituted the social and
political thought of the Labour Party.

However, during the

1970s, a combination of factions within the party and poor
relationships with other parties supporting the devolution
deterred the development of a feasible devolution plan.^^
The Scottish National Party, the Scottish Liberals, and
the Scottish Labour Party, while all wanting some form of
autonomy for Scotland, did not have the same immediate goals
in mind.

The Scottish Nationalists were not content with

the mere state of devolved power, but wanted complete
separation from England.

They believed their argument was

credible because the North Sea oil would make their economy
a viable one.^®
The Liberals were in favor of devolution, but disagreed
with the Labour Party's devolution plan.

The parties

refused to work together to form a cohesive and satisfactory
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plan which all of the parties would support.

Essentially,

it was the lack of organization and ability to work together
which constituted the failure of the devolution referendum
in 1979.

However, there were other reasons for the failure,

such as determining who was part of the electorate in
Scotland, and a single question rather than a multiple
question referendum which led to resentment as well as a
split in voting.

Many Labour and Liberal Party supporters

did not vote for devolution because the proposal was not
radical enough, it did not include the type of change they
expected in the referendum, or it did not promise enough
autonomy for Scotland.

As a result, the referendum

failed.
There were also several fears and some confusion
attached to devolution that prevented people from voting for
it or caused them to abstain from the vote.

The fear of

complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom,
which many people believed would be inevitable if Scotland
were to have home rule, the fear of regionalism, and the
fear of the disintegration of the United Kingdom were ones
which caused the referendum to fail.

These fears are not

without basis, considering complete separation of Scotland
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from the United Kingdom was exactly what the Scottish
National Party advocated^".
However, when considering the oil crises in the 1970's,
as well as Scotland's dependency in areas such as foreign
affairs, the military, and finance for Scotland's
infrastructure, the actual occurrence of separation was not
a plausible threat.

These fears were not addressed by the

1979 referendum, and the lack of cooperation between the
parties exacerbated these fears rather than alleviating
them.
Yet, these fears and the failure of the referendum did
not stop the Labour Party from retaining devolution on their
platform, the Scottish Nationalists from, working towards
separation, or the Liberal Party from advocating devolved
power.

Retention of devolution on these parties' platforms

has several explanations.

The Labour Party, whose division

over devolution was reflected in the lack of consensus in
the referendum vote, committed itself to a stronger form of
devolution than the Scotland Act had contained.

However,

when the Labour Party lost power after the devolution
referendum, devolution became less of a priority while
addressing issues more pressing and more likely to win
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elections became the focal point.

The Liberal Party and

the newly formed Social Democratic Party remained focused on
devolution, but the failure of the Scotland Act in 1979 had
shaken their confidence.

Consequently, their attentions

shifted to other pressing matters.^''
Devolution was not dead.

In fact, after years under a

Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher, another
revival of Scottish nationalism was inevitable.

Thatcher's

Conservative government was not interested in resolving
Scotland's socio-economic problems.

Her government made

decisions which had adverse affects on Scotland.

As a

result, the Scots felt slighted, as though they had only a
token voice in the British Parliament.

Consequently, with

the economic strain, lack of control over their domestic
affairs, and a renewed sense of national identity, the
political parties in Scotland saw their chance to bring a
new, improved and cohesive plan for devolution back to the
Scottish people.
Acknowledging the lack of unity among the parties in
favor of some form of devolution, the Constitutional
Convention was formed.

The Labour Party, the Liberal Party,

the Scottish National Party, and the Social Democratic Party
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were all a part of this effort.

Their combined efforts were

essential in order to develop a devolution referendum that
considered and resolved previously existing problems.
Support for the Constitutional Convention increased as the
popularity of the Conservative Party, led by Margaret
Thatcher and then John Major, steadily declined.

In 1995,

Tony Blair saw devolution as a key component of the Labour
Party's platform for the next election.

Blair, as the

leader of the Labour Party, made devolution a national issue
rather than merely a Scottish one.

With Blair's full

support of devolution for both Scotland and Wales, the
Constitutional Convention gained credibility and increased
SUi~mTl^+'
r
—It is undeniable that the socio-economic conditions
were prime for devolution and played a significant role.
However, without the Labour Party's use of devolution as a
part of its campaign platform, it is unlikely the referendum
would have passed.

Therefore, it is the thesis of this

study that the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum passed
because of the endorsement of the Labour Party and the
cohesion and agreement among the parties.
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Devolution was necessary to give Scotland the authority
it needed to resolve domestic problems.

Chapter One asserts

that devolution was a result of Scotland's economic and
nationalistic need manipulated by a political machine (the
Labour Party) to achieve devolution.

Chapter Two is an

historical analysis of Scotland's struggle for autonomy,
illustrating how nationalism and economics were the tools
the political machines manipulated throughout Scotland's
history.

Whether the decisions were made by the masses or

by the elites, devolution and union were a political
decision.

Chapter Three analyzes the roles of economics and

nationalism.

It illustrates how extreme displays of

nationalism, industry's support of devolution, and economic
distress or prosperity alone were not enough to bring about
devolution.^®

Chapter Four examines the role the Labour

Party played in organizing the devolution movement.

Changes

in party focus were necessary to make devolution a reality
as well as to give Labour an electoral victory.

Chapter

Five concludes the study with an analysis offered by the
author from the evidence presented in the previous four
chapters.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Though Scotland is composed of people descending from
various different cultures, such as the Scandinavians, the
French, and others, it was originally populated by the
Picts, and then later by the Scots who came from Ireland.
These two groups of people, known as Celts, had their own
distinct language, their own culture, and physical
characteristics which made them far different than the
Romans, and later the Anglo-Normans, who attempted to invade
them throughout the centuries.*
Through different phases in history, the Celts were
both feared for their savagery and manipulated easily due to
their indigenous state.

Their savagery and innocence were

mainly due to the violent struggle among the clans for
control.

Failed attempts at unification have repeatedly led

Scotland into a state of vulnerability from first the
Romans, and later the English.

Throughout the centuries,

the Celts have fought against each other for control over
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land, and fought against outside forces to maintain their
sovereignty.^

Historical Events Preceding The Act Of Union

The Celtic people of Scotland and Ireland are believed
to have migrated from northern Italy to the British Isles
sometime before 80 BC.

While there is no documentation of

the existence of the Celts before this date, there are a
number of written descriptions from the Romans about them.
The Roman's first documented encounter with the Celts was in
80 AD when Julius Agricola attempted to cross the River
Clyde and was deterred by bands of warring Celts.^
The threat of Roman invasion forced the Celts to
refrain from fighting each other and to unite against the
Romans.

So, in 84 AD, the Celts' first attempt at

unification was under Calgacus to fight against the Romans.
Calgacus, along with 10,000 Celts were killed when they met
the Roman army at Ardoch.

However, their lives were not

given in vain as their efforts forced the Romans from
Scotland.

Their defeat, combined with the violence and lack

of humane behavior exhibited by the Celts during battle,
instilled fear in the Romans.''
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Diodorus Siculus, a Roman historian described the Celts

...terrifying...They are very tall in stature,
with rippling muscles under clear white skin. Their
hair is blond, but not naturally so: they bleach it, to
this day, artificially, washing it in lime and combing
it back from their foreheads. They look like wooddemons, their hair thick and shaggy like a horse's
mane. Some of them are clean-shaven, but othersespecially those of high rank, shave their cheeks but
leave a moustache that covers the whole mouth and,
when they eat and drink, acts like a sieve, trapping
particles of food...The way they dress is astonishing:
they wear brightly colored and embroidered shirts, with
trousers called bracae and cloaks fastened at the
shoulder with a brooch, heavy in winter, light in
summer. These cloaks are striped or checkered in
design, with the separate checks close together and in
various colors.^

He also describes their battle dress, which includes bronze
helmets with figures picked out on them, even horns, which
made them look even taller than they physically were.
Others covered themselves with breast-armor made out of
chains, while others fought naked.

Before entering battle,

the Celts used intimidation tactics such as playing weird,
discordant horns to create frightening noises in conjunction
with their shouting in loud, harsh voices and beating their
swords rhythmically against their shields.®
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The Romans wore armor, carried shields, and cropped
their hair, but these were civilized and accepted manners in
warfare.

They saw the differences in the Celtic culture and

tried to conquer them because of these differences.
Differences in religion, language, and the legal and
authoritative systems which compelled the Celts to paint
their faces, dye their hair, act like animals, and commit
savage acts were beyond the understanding of the Romans.^
The Romans soon learned to be frightened of these
noises, because the Celts not only sounded violent and
demented, they acted violent and demented.

The Celts cut

off their enemies' heads and nailed them over the doors of
their huts in the manner a hunter would do with the skulls
of the animal he has slain.

The unpredictable and

frightening behavior of the Celts compelled the Romans to
protect their empire rather than attempt to expand it into
Scotland.®
This fear of the Celts compelled the Emperor Hadrian to
build a wall in 120 AD which was intended to keep the Celts
out of the empire.

Extending from the Irish Sea to the

North Sea, Hadrian's Wall measured approximately ten feet
high, and as much as five feet thick in some parts.

For a
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time, the wall discouraged the Celts' attacks on the Romans.
Though an estimable deterrent, the wall failed to stop the
fierce Celts and Anglos from joining together and attacking
the Romans in London in 368 AD.

They were not successful,

but the fact that they traveled to London to attack the
Romans was enough to instill fear of the Celts in the
Romans.

Consequently, fear was the basis for Rome's

decision to leave the Celts to their own culture and
language.®
The Celts no longer had the Romans to contend with, but
they still had each other.

Renewed internal power struggles

over land, and the need for control of the different tribes
within Scotland contributed to the disunited turmoil of the
Celts.

Even with the advent of St. Columba, who

christianized the Celts, the clans continued bitterly to
dislike each other.
Finally, in 843 AD, Kenneth MacAlpin united the two
Celtic tribes, the Scots from Ireland and the Picts of
Scotland.

The unification process MacAlpin started was not

completed until at least 1034 AD and perhaps much later.
This unification process was not a peaceful one, with family
members killing each other, such as Malcolm II killing
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Kenneth III and becoming king in 1005.

Duncan of

Strathclyde killed his grandfather (Malcolm II) in 1034 to
become king.

MacBeth, in 1040, killed Duncan and became

King, and Malcolm Canmore killed MacBeth in 1057 AD to
become king.

With fratricide prevalent in the ruling class

of Scotland, there is little wonder that clans were
continually at odds with one another.

England's Domination of Scotland

Yet, even with the existence of ruling-class violence,
Scotland continued to remain united under the changing
rulers and remained free of English rule.

However, upon the

death of Edgar in 1107, Scotland's unity was seriously
threatened. Scotland was split into regions and ruled by two
different kings.

Alexander I became the King of Scots, but

David I became King of Lothian and Strathclyde.

Tenuous

unity was restored upon Alexander I's death in 1124 AD.

At

this time, David became king of the Scots, and his- reign was
one of the most important in Scotland's history.

His

borders extended beyond Scottish borders to the River Tees
and Northumberland in England.

Scotland was a powerful

force to be reckoned with, but it was soon to be conquered
by the English.
Scotland's unity was destroyed by England's annexation
of Scotland in 1296.

Clan conflicts and internal betrayal

led to King Edward I's vanquishing the Scots.

Scottish

lairds were seduced by King Edward I's promises of lands and
riches if they submitted to English rule.

Edward's rule,

though at times unfair to the lairds, was cruel and unjust
to the peasants and middle-class Scots.

High taxes and

Edward's desire to remove Scottishness from the Scots worked
to destroy Scotland's social and economic structure.

A lack

of identity, economic depression, and political helplessness
almost destroyed Scotland.

Embarrassing incidents, such as

England's capture of its Coronation Stone, also added to the
deterioration of their identity.
Known by the Scots as the "The Stone of Destiny" or
"The Stone of Scone," the Coronation Stone was used for
crowning Scotland's rulers.

Stealing the Scots' Coronation

Stone was another illustration of England's domination of
Scotland.

It was placed in Westminster Abbey as a slight to

the Scots and as a show of dominion over them.

Yet, even

with this slight, the Scottish lairds did nothing to defend
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Scotland against England.

Scottish rebels, such as William

Wallace, managed to inspire the Scottish masses to rebel
against the English.
Wallace pushed the English out of Scotland, even going
as far as to threaten military strong-holds in England.
However, though Wallace had the support of the Scottish
masses, he was betrayed by the Scottish lairds.

Upon his

capture, Wallace was tortured, hanged, and drawn and
quartered.

Wallace became a martyr, and his cause was taken

up by Robert the Bruce, a laird who had sided with the
English before Wallace's death.
Once again unified under Robert the Bruce, the Celts
routed the English in 1314 at Bannockburn.

Scotland was

recognized as being independent by both the Church and
England.

The marriage of James (Stuart)VI of Scotland to

King Henry VII's daughter in 1502 was significant because it
decreased the level of violence on both sides of the border.
Eliminating the violence and joining the aristocracy of
Scotland and England paved the way for the Union of Crowns
in 1603, as well as setting the stage for the Act of Union
in 1707."
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Act of Union in 1707

The joining of the Crowns was the first step towards
Union.

Other catalysts of the eventual union of Scotland

and England were the differences in religion due to the
Reformation in the mid-lSOO's as well as the economic
condition of Scotland.

Scotland's long history of internal

turmoil was typified by the differences between the Highland
Scots and the Lowland Scots.
lessen as time passed.

Internal turmoil did not

The Reformation did nothing to

alleviate the clash between them because the Lowland Scots
quickly, and with very little resistance, converted to
Presbyterianism while the Highlanders remained Catholic.
Converting to Protestantism at first appeared to have
resolved the religious differences between the English and
the Scots, but later proved to be a false hope.
In 1688, William of Orange asked the English Parliament
to oust the current King James VI of Scotland (also known as
James II of England).

William pushed for displacing James

II because James II's own rule stated that "...attending a
Covenanting (a secret meeting of Scottish Presbyterians) was
an act of worship considered as a capital c r i m e . M a n y
Scottish Presbyterians paid the penalty for this crime, and

James II succeeded in alienating all people upon whom he
relied for support.

He was forced from the thrones of

England and Scotland in 1688, ending the rule of the Stuart
Kings."
James II accepted his exile peacefully, but many of his
followers did not, resulting in terrible battles between the
Scottish Protestants and English Protestants.

Fighting also

occurred between these two sects of Protestants and the
Scottish Catholics, who still had strong ties with Catholic
France.

One side perceived William of Orange as the valiant

champion of Presbyterians against the Scottish Catholics.
However, this view is not commonly accepted by historians
because of conflicting evidence that William of Orange was
on friendly terms with the Pope and had many Catholics
fighting in his army.

The motivation behind William of

Orange's action was purely a political maneuver against
James II.
The religious wars eventually came to a halt, with the
Highland Scots being forced to swear their loyalty to the
anti-Catholic, anti-Stuart, anti-Scots, anti-Highlander, and
anti-French English King from Holland.

King William of

Orange dealt with the Scots, but the betrayal and
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humiliation suffered by many Scots at his hands would plant
slowly growing seeds for the Jacobite Rebellion, which was
an uprising between Stuart royalists and Scots and English
loyal to the monarchs of England, in the 1700's.^^
Other key factors for unification were the role
economics and the possible military threat from the English.
Scotland's economy was primarily agricultural, with little
industry to bring prosperity to those who already were
fairly affluent.

Industrialization would increase the

profits of the affluent from the efforts of the lower
classes, persuading the upper class to embrace the union.
The other factor was the constant military threat from the
English.

The English, who were constantly at odds with the

French, feared the alliance still existing between France
and Scotland.

As a result, the English amassed a strong

military force at its northern borders in the event the
Scots, with their French allies, would attempt an invasion.
Therefore, political and economic elites in the Lowlands saw
the advantages a Union would offer.

A union between the

Crowns had existed successfully for years, and they presumed
that it would not be very difficult to persuade the Scots to
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sacrifice their sovereignty for the advantages a union would
offer.'®

Eighteenth Century Scotland

At first, the Union appeared to be accepted by the
Scots.

With Scots placed in the position of resolving

Scotland's local problems, it seemed that the Scots were
satisfied.

However, clan rivalry and old feuds often were

at the root of unfair actions taken by empowered Scots.

As

a result, corruption and abuse of the system were common
occurrences.

High taxes on Scottish goods and services,

such as whiskey and woolens, as well as high rents on
farmland were perceived as being another unfair act against
them.

As a result, cattle rustling and whiskey smuggling

were common forms of rebellion which the Scots believed were
totally within their rights.'®
Unfair economic policies and situations, along with
religious, social, and political differences were the water
for the dormant seeds left over from previous conflicts for
the Jacobites.

Social problems, such as the breakdown of

the clan system, played a significant role in the Jacobite
rebellion.

The clan chiefs increasingly behaved as lords

with absolute rights over property and people, rather than
acting as family leaders with responsibilities and loyalties
to their people.

The Anglicization and intermarriages

between the English and Scottish aristocracy destroyed the
relationship between the lairds of the clans and their
people.
The political forces behind Culloden and the Highland
Clearances were the romanticism of the Stuart dynasty, who
were actually arrogant and capricious political leaders.
The Stuarts

were firm believers in the idea of "the divine

rights of kings," and were not always willing to treat
commoners serving in their army with the respect they
deserved.

In fact, the whimsicality of Prince Charles lost

him a great deal of support from Highlanders, Lowlanders,
and Catholic Englishmen.
While the majority of Highlanders supporting the Stuart
cause were Catholic or Episcopalian, it was not a
prerequisite for a Jacobite to be a Catholic.

The Stuarts,

however, were fanatical Catholics, and had had a long
history of persecuting those people who did not share their
religious beliefs.

When in power, the Stuarts had

consistently refused to allow any freedom of worship or
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belief to Presbyterian Scots.

The principle behind the

Jacobite cause was to restore the Scots on their own throne
and their own government.

However, religious differences

and the Stuarts' past history of religious intolerance
combined to lose support for their cause.
The first battle occurred in 1715, with the English and
loyal Scots defeating the Jacobites.

What ensued was a time

of terrible violence, with the English and clans loyal to
the English crown hunting down the Jacobites led by the
young Prince Charles Edward Stuart, also known as "Bonnie
Prince Charlie."

The Jacobites were persistent and hopeful,

but they were finally defeated by the English and Scottish
armies in 1746 at the Battle of Culloden.^^
The "pacification" of the Highlanders and others who
were loyal to the Jacobite cause began with the intent of
destroying the ancient life of the glens.

The lands and

titles of Jacobites were confiscated, and they were left in
poverty.

An iron fist and the spying by clans, such as the

Campbells, controlled the Highlanders.^''
The bitterness of being controlled by the English and a
few clans, as well as having their language and their
culture repressed were part of the pacification process.
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After Culloden, the Scots were no longer allowed to wear
kilts, carry weapons, more specifically the Scottish
Claymore broadsword, or play the bagpipes.

Standard

English, rather than the Scottish dialect, was to be taught
in schools, and Gaelic was not to be spoken in schools or
socially.

The Highlanders were viewed as barbarians or

"wild Irish," and their culture was crude and unacceptable
to the Lowlanders and the English.

The Scottish were no

longer working in Scottish industries, Scottish social
conditions, or represented by a Scottish political body.
These three forces worked to quell rebellious Scots and
compelled the Scottish masses to conform to superior English
standards.

Nineteenth Century Scotland

By the end of the 18th Century, the Jacobites had been
defeated, impoverished, and humiliated to the extent where
they no longer had the heart for rebellion.

Economic

prosperity for the merchant class, and later the middle
class, brought about by the Union was due to heavy industry.
The transition from a small farm, agricultural-based economy
to an industrial-based economy was one which had a
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devastating impact on the crofters and small farmers.

The

crofters and small farmers were pushed off their lands and
replaced by sheep or by game stocked in the forests for
recreational hunting by the aristocracy and the rich.^"'
The Clearances of the 19th Century forced crofters into
working in heavy industry, such as mining, steelworks, and
other mass-producing industries which made the middle and
upper class rich, but did nothing for the peasants working
in the factories.

Unfortunately, the Clearances, which

covered the years from 1800-1850, could not have occurred at
a worse time.

The end of the Napoleonic wars brought

economic upheaval and distress everywhere in Europe.

With

so many men coming back from the wars to a poor economy,
which offered little opportunity for employment, thousands
of people were living below poverty levels.

The comforting

and consistent opportunities for employment previously
existing in the agricultural sector were gone.

There was no

money for soldiers' pensions, and thousands of men were
going hungry or did not have the means to support their
families.

Consequently, the Highland Clearances, in

conjunction with the overall economically depressed state of
Scotland, had devastating results.^®
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However, not all-modern perspectives of nineteenthcentury Scotland were negative.

One perspective offered by

Lindsay Paterson is that the nineteenth-century was the
building block for modern Scotland, asserting that the
dominant theme of nineteenth-century Scottish politics was
successful nationalism.

He maintains that the Scots

believed they were exercising national autonomy, even when
they did not have their own parliament.

He posits that the

Scots believed they were capable of exercising their
autonomy through various local institutions established to
handle local problems.^®
The Scots were able to realize and maintain their sense
of autonomy because of the widening of the franchise in the
1820's.

The franchise was widened to give real power to the

new middle class of the industrial revolution.

It was also

the significant state involvement in social policy in the
1840's which worked to transform Scotland into a liberal
welfare state.

The establishment of the Scottish Office in

1885 was a result of the increased autonomy of Scotland.
This institution was inaugurated in response to nationalist
complaints that the growing involvement of the London
government in social policy threatened to leave Scotland at
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a disadvantage b'ecause it did not have an administration of
its own.

The Scottish Office's power and influence grew in

relation to Scotland's wants and needs.

Consequently, it

became the primary agency responsible for maintaining the
Welfare State in Scotland.

Paterson contends that Scottish

nationalism, in this sense, earned Scotland the position of
a full partner in an empire rather than a province.^®
England, however, did not perceive Scotland as an
equal partner or even worth acknowledging because they did
not believe the Scots were their social, cultural, or
economic equal.

As a result, the English largely ignored

how the Scots ran their domestic affairs.

How domestic

affairs were conducted depended upon the leniency of the
Home Secretary or the Lord Advocate of the Burgh.

While

some Scots were perturbed by the lack of acknowledgement, a
great many of them took advantage of England's lack of
attention and focused on establishing free trade, an
education system superior to that of the English system,
religious cohesion, and their own unique legal system.
Scottish social policy was governed by the system of
supervisory boards that grew from the 1840's onward.

The
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Board members were put in charge of administering all
the subsequent social legislation that parliament produced
in the nineteenth century.

These supervisory boards

consisted of local and national committees of lawyers, other
professionals, and aristocrats.

The boards also ran the

poor law, the rudimentary system of public health, the
insane asylums, as well as the prisons, and the industrial
schools for juvenile delinquents.
births, marriages and deaths.

They also registered

Eventually, the boards would

regulate agricultural programs, development of the
Highlands, the valuation of property, and housing
regulations.^^

This system lasted until 1885 when the

office of Secretary for Scotland was created.
Socially, Scotland's nineteenth century policies
brought about beneficial changes.

Its educational system

produced some of the greatest thinkers, inventors,
scientists and engineers of the century.With
professional success came an increase in philanthropic
organizations, and Scotland's social programs began to
benefit more than the upper classes.

These organizations

gave middle-class women a role in social policy that was
substantial, but without challenging the male dominance in
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formal social, political, and economic structures.

One of

the organizations that was backed by the crusading zeal of
women was the National Vigilance Association, which was
established to protect children from prostitution.

Though a

large number of these groups were founded on religious
principles of the Church of Scotland, they were not
adversely affected by the split in the church, acting as a
key institution for socializing middle-class English
immigrants into Scottish civil society.^®
Women's participation in social programs gave them
power and influence that men did not have.

By the latter

part of the century, some middle-class women also gained the
right to vote in local elections, such as the municipal
councils in 1882 and school boards in 1873.

A larger

female-to-male ratio in some parts of Scotland gave women a
greater influence in local electorates.

From 1873 onward,

women were also allowed to stand for election to school
boards, and some of them achieved significant educational
advances for women and the working class.
The revival of Scottish culture was due to the
successful economic and educational advances for the upper
and middle classes, as well as the death of Jacobitism.

Jacobitism, the practice of those who fought for the Stuarts
to regain the Scottish throne, was quelled by the
overwhelming British victory over the Scots at Culloden in
1745.

Broken and poor, the surviving rebels no longer had

the heart or the resources to continue to fight for the
Stuarts.
A new definition of community was established because
Jacobitism was no longer a threat to the political stability
of Scotland.

A newly unified national culture developed

around the symbols of the Highlands and Gaelic.

The romance

of the Highlands and the lost cause of the Jacobites
appealed to both the Lowland Scots and the Highland Scots.
The new clan societies were very popular, and the sense of
loyalty and camaraderie associated with the clan system
played a national role in famine relief in the middle of the
•3p

century.

The Scots of the late nineteenth century romanticized
the past and believed themselves to be a unique society.
They praised poets from the past century who wrote in the
Scottish dialect, such as Robert Burns, and they praised
novelists who wrote stories about Scottish bravery and
heroism, such as Sir Walter Scott.

Yet, for all the
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celebration of Scottish culture, the Scots were still trying
to eradicate any trace of the Scottish brogue from their
dialect, and voluntarily refrained from teaching Gaelic in
schools.

This need to conform was only one contradiction to

their celebration of Scottish culture.

The other

contradiction was "unionist nationalism," which will be
'discussed in the next chapter.^®
The nineteenth century had its difficulties.

In the

middle part of the century, the Church of Scotland split.
The Church had played a significant part in creating and
controlling local civil governments, and their instability
resulted in an unstable local government.

The Scots were

able to rise above religious and governmental instability.
By putting general Christian principles rather than ones
specific to either church or state above everything else,
the Scots resolved their religious problems.''"
The religious split was easily resolved in comparison
to the on-going political struggle.

Opinions vary on

whether the struggle was solely between the Scots and the
English, or the whether it was between Scottish groups who
were supported by the English, and those who were not.

The

relationship between Scotland and England has appeared to

have revolved around one ignoring the other, but the civil
political strife has been a problem which has consistently
weakened Scotland/^
Having illustrated that they were capable of separating
Church from State, and emotion from reason, the English
became lenient towards the Scots.

Scots were once again

allowed to dress in their traditional dress, carry weapons,
and indulge themselves in other Scottish activities which
had previously been forbidden.

Twentieth Century Scotland

The turn of the century brought more responsibilities
to the local governments in Scotland.

Consequently, the

status of the Office of the Secretary for Scotland was
enhanced in 1926 to that of Secretary of State.

As the

Secretary of State's responsibilities grew, St. Andrew's
House in Edinburgh became the new home of The Scottish
Office in 1939, and the functions of the Scottish Office in
London were transferred to Edinburgh.

Since this

transferal, increased power has been given to The Scottish
Office to handle more effectively Scotland's domestic
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affairs, such as industrial support, training, higher
education, and the arts/^
However, not all people were satisfied with the power
given to them by the British Parliament.

The incredible

number of people who lost their jobs in the 1950's when
heavy industry rapidly declined, the lack of attention the
problems in Scotland were receiving from the British
Parliament, and the under-representation of the Scots and
their interests in the Parliament were grounds for
discontent.

Scotland's discontent with their economic

situation made them feel powerless to do anything about it.
A revival of nationalism during the late 1960's and 1970's
was the result of discontent and helplessness.

The

discovery of oil in the North Sea off the Coast of Scotland
led many Scots to believe that they could successfully
separate from England and economically survive."

The

Scottish Nationalists perceived the oil discovery as their
chance to push for separation.

After all, economics had had

a significant impact on politics in the past, transforming
Scotland from a free state to a pseudo-partner with England.
Consequently, the SNP asserted that the oil was Scottish
oil, and the profits should not be shared with the English.

Scottish nationalism was the key to creating a political
force which would lead to Scotland's separation from the
United Kingdom."
There are varying degrees of nationalism, and though
the majority of Scots were frustrated with the current
political and economic situation, they were not in favor of
separation.

Surveys and polls of the Scottish populace in

the 1950's and 1970's resulted in a clear majority in
support of some form of devolved government.
The Scots voted on a devolution referendum in 1979, but
it failed.

There are several events considered responsible

for the referendum's failure, but none are as widely
accepted as the impact party fractionalization had on the
1979 referendum.

Due to the consistent lack of cohesion

among the parties favoring devolution, the referendum
failed.

Separatists took away votes from the referendum

because they were unwilling to settle for devolution.
Others voted against the referendum simply because they
feared devolution would lead to separation.

The Labour

Party in particular was so seriously divided over the
referendum that it not only failed to pass it, but it also
lost the next election.^®
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The Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, won
the 1980 election.

Thatcher was not sympathetic to the

Scots and their problems, and for the most part ignored
their demands.

She was, in fact, accused of using Scotland

as a testing ground for unpopular measures, describing large
areas of Scottish life as being "sheltered from market
forces; an exhibit of cultural dependence rather than that
of enterprise.
Mrs. Thatcher also earned the disdain of the Scots when
she informed them that they were privileged to be subsidized
by the "marvelously tolerant English."^® In addition to
Thatcher's disdain of the Scots, her Party's efforts to take
control over the superior Scottish educational system and
other domestic affairs angered the Scots.

Thatcher's words

and actions made the Scots feel that they were less than
full partners with the English in the United Kingdom.^®
The effects of Thatcherism were carried on by the
Conservative Party even after Thatcher was replaced by John
Major,

Major was regarded with less resentment, but he

still was not able to change the Scots' opinions of the
Conservative Party.

The Conservative Party's failure to

resolve problems existing in Scotland, their lack of
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attention to devolution, and remnants of Thatcherism lost
them the 1997 election to the Labour Party.
The Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, has long been
known as Scotland's party.

Blair knew the extent of

discontent in Scotland, and persuaded the national Labour
Party to add devolution to its campaign platform.

The

Scottish Labour Party, in conjunction with the Scottish
Liberal Party,

had long been working on a plan for

devolution, and with the British Labour Party's endorsement
of devolution. Labour was sure to win, and devolution was
soon to be a reality.

On September 12, 1997, the Scottish

devolution referendum passed with seventy-five percent of
Scotland voting in favor of devolution.^''
Scotland has had a long history of nationalistic and
economic strife.

Yet, decisions about its internal unity

and sovereignty were not made based solely on economic and
nationalistic reasons, but due to political reasons.
However, these two factors have played a strong and
influential role in Scotland's history as it will be
illustrated in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS ON THE
DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM

Nationalism throughout the world has evolved into in a
new form known as ethnonationalism.

This new form of

nationalism has been defined as,
an extension and a continuation of past nationalist
movements, borrowing from the same vocabulary, and, by
and large, articulating the demands of distinct ethnic
groups living within a state to emancipate themselves
by asserting their identity and attempting to translate
it into political autonomy or political sovereignty.^
Ethnonationalism attempts to translate nationality into some
form of statehood, and is the powerful political force
behind the push for devolution in Scotland.
Modern nationalism is a powerful, unifying political
ideology.

It is a strong and emotional force which has been

the basis and justification for wars, hatred, and
intolerance of others since the beginning of the nationstate.

Nationalism unites people through common ancestry,

ethnicity, consciousness of common traditions and history.
It also gives people a will to maintain their beliefs,
religion, language, and territory.^
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Providing an identity
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for people gives them a sense of security and belonging.
Being a part of a group who share beliefs and cultural
identity provides people with the confidence and strength
found in acceptance.

When no common territory exists, as

was the case with the Jews, the Greeks, and the Poles, it
was the memory of common territory they occupied in the past
that kindles their desire to return.

When no political body

exists to take care of the needs of people, they begin to
demand their right to have their needs met, just as when one
nationality holds the power to make decisions for another.^
Nationalism has been linked with some terrible events.
In the 1940's, the Nazis manipulated the identity of the
German people to justify heinous acts.

Nazism included the

usual nationalist and racist themes but also promised social
and economic reforms which attacked political and economic
elites.

The Nazis also identified the "domestic" and

"outside" enemies of Germany as the victorious powers who
must be defeated.

These enemies were notably England,

France, and the Jews.^

Exterminating millions of Jews,

gypsies, Russians and Poles for the purpose of protecting
the "pure" Aryan race from contamination was what the Nazis
justified through nationalism.

Another more recent example of nationalism gone awry
was ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

For years, Bosnian Serbs,

Croatians, and Muslims have fought over land, religion, and
ethnicity.

Violence has been a part of their lives for

years, making them almost immune to the killing of another
race just because their religion and ethnicity are
different.

Other violence linked to nationalism in Western

Europe is embodied in the acts of the Irish Republican Army.
Their acts have set back peace talks and negotiations
between Northern Ireland and Ireland for years.

The IRA's

attacks upon the Anglo-Irish Protestant merited the radical
Protestant group's retaliation against the Irish Catholics.
The militia wing of the IRA is the most radical side of
Irish nationalism justifying the use of violence to achieve
their goal of a united Ireland.

Other nationalist groups,

such as Sein Fenn, do not advocate violence in their work
towards peace between Northern Ireland and Ireland.
However, all the peaceful efforts are ignored by the radical
groups because of their conflicting goals of peace versus
reunification.

Yet, though violence has been associated

with nationalism, a complete lack of nationalism can be just
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as detrimental to the state as a radical form of nationalism
is.^
Nationalism defines states.

A state lacking a sense of

nationalism has no culturally or socially defining features
which makes it any different from any other country.
Unfortunately, because of the past events which have used
nationalism as a justification for violence, a bad
connotation has been associated with it.

Eastern Europe is

riddled with examples of violent nationalism.

However, not

all forms of nationalism are violent or threatening.

One

such example is the nationalist movement in Scotland.
Since the Jacobite Rebellion, there has not been a
violent, nationalist demonstration in Scotland against the
English.

Fierce football competition between the two

countries is a mild display of nationalism in comparison to
the bloodbaths of other examples of nationalism.

The Scots

have also taken great pride in having produced far more
disciplined and courageous soldiers than the English, but
this cannot be confused with the violent type of nationalism
existing in other countries.
In fact, there are diametrically opposing views of the
path of Scottish nationalism from the Union of 1707 until
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the present.

One side asserts that Scottish identity died

and was replaced by a nation's need to mimic the identity of
the superior English.

The other side claims that Scottish

identity has always remained strong and only needed to be
reawakened by economic and social decline, as well as by the
lack of attention they received from the British Parliament.
However, until Scotland's economic situation had fallen into
terrible, seemingly unrecoverable decline, very little
attention was paid by the Scottish masses to Scotland's
political authority.

Thus, the economic conditions in

Scotland have historically had a direct correlation with the
level of nationalistic fervor.®

Sco'b'tish Na'txonalism and Economics

Historically, Scots have had a long tradition of having
a strong national identity at different levels.

National

heroes such as Robert the Bruce, William Wallace and Robert
"Roy" MacGregor have kept alive the pride of the Scottish
tradition and its heritage.

Other nationalities came to

conquer the Scots but found themselves integrated into a
unique Celtic culture, and now call themselves Scots.

The

Celts, which have remained the dominant ethnic group in the
Highlands, have integrated with Scandinavian and French
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people.

This integration has brought cultural enrichment

and strengthened already existing traditions in Scottish
culture.

Yet, not all Scots have the same ancestral

background, and the lack of common ancestry has been a
source of tension between them."'
Unlike the Highland Scots, the Lowland Scots are mostly
a mixture of Anglo-Norman blood.

While having Norman blood

may not seem such a glaring defect in the eyes of the modern
world, at one time having such tainted blood would have
ostracized an individual from a Highland Clan.

Nationalism

existed not only as an identity for Scotland as a whole, but
for individual clans as well.®

Consequently, feuding among

the clans, wnetner oecause of coiripetition for leadership
over the other clans, ownership of land, or due to personal
insult, was Scotland's largest weakness.

More often than

not, the Scots were defeated by the English because of
betrayal from their own people rather than by the strength
of the English.
Scottish nationalism not only worked for the Scots but
also against them.

For example, William Wallace attempted

to unite Scotland against the English in the 1300's.
Wallace had the support of the Scottish masses, but he was

betrayed by the Scottish lairds who were seduced by Edward I
of England's promise of lands and wealth if they gave up
their fight for a free Scotland.

The Scottish lairds

agreed, and Wallace was given to the English to torture and
kill to set an example for those who sought to unite against
them.

Nationalism suffered in the short run with the loss

of Wallace, but the guilt of betraying their leader,
continued economic and social oppression, as well as broken
promises by the English compelled some Scottish Lords, such
as Robert the Bruce, to fight for a free Scotland.®
Nationalism played a key role in defeating the English
at Bannock Burn in the 1300's.

The Scots were fighting to

improve their way of life, their heritage, and their
culture.

They had once again won the right to rule

themselves.

Once free, Scotland found itself constantly

struggling to maintain their autonomy from England.

As a

result, Scottish nationalism went into decline, having been
cast in the shadows compared to belonging to a certain clan,
improving one's economic situation, or making a decent
living.

Betrayal and pacts with the English overrode

national pride and loyalty.^®
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As a result, in 1603, when the Crowns of Scotland and
England were united, there was very little resistance.
After all, the man residing on the throne was Scottish, so
the Scots had nothing to be concerned about.

Yet, if the

Scottish masses had been aware of how very little their
Scottish king associated himself with Scotland, they would
have been concerned.

King James VI of Scotland, also known

as King James II of England, cared very little for his
Scottish heritage.

He pandered to the superior English

culture, whose manners and civilization were so refined that
they made him ashamed of his Scottish heritage.
Eventually, these feelings of being economically and
socially inferior were felt by Scottish elites and
merchants.

They felt the bite of English snobbery and

economic superiority.

These Scottish elites failed to

recognize their own unique culture or their economic
potential, such as mass export of their whiskey, salmon
exports, or their woolen goods.

Consequently, in 1707, when

greedy merchants and opportunistic Scottish lairds sought an
alliance with England, it was not surprising that their
national pride was the farthest thing from their minds.
Their desire for the economic affluence was so great that

60

they were willing to give up their right to rule themselves
by abolishing their parliament and joining the British
Parliament.

This decision had nothing to do with

nationalism.

After all, only the upper echelon of Scottish

society were the ones who made the decisions--the masses
were not given the chance to voice their opinion on the
topic.

The Union of 1707 was an elitist political decision

based on economic prosperity for the very few rather than
the majority.

The Act of Union's Influence on Nationalism and Economics

The Act of Union was a dark time for Scottish
nationalism.

Yet, there were writers, such as Sir Walter

Scott who chose to glorify the Scottish people in his
novels.

He focused on their courage, loyalty and strength.

Scott attempted to preserve Scottishness while still
supporting the Union between Scotland and England.

Though

he meant well, Scott's work is thought by many current
nationalists to be a romanticization of Scottish life which
only added to the quaintness of Scotland.

This quaintness

gave the sophisticated English an edge over the barbaric
Scots.
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Later in Scottish history, the Scottish poet Robert
Burns attempted to revive Scottish nationalism.

Burns'

poetry was written in the Scottish dialect, which had almost
been completely eradicated from schools, as had Gaelic, the
original first language of the Scots.

There were other

poets and novelists who wrote realistic works about Scottish
life and old traditions, and who were basically ignored
until the twentieth century.
basically two reasons:

They were ignored for

Scotland was in denial of its

identity or because Scots enjoyed reading works by and about
a culture other than their own.^^
Economic prosperity and the large number of social
programs the union funded were another significant reason
for the lack of nationalism in Scotland until the twentieth
century.

Industrialization of Scotland, namely steel mills

and ship building, employed thousands of Scots.

Other

industries, such as modern agriculture and manufacturing
took root, employing a great number of Scots.

Access to

Indian markets, access to all the colonial markets, as well
as modern ethnic nationalism and movements of regional
decentralization were in essence the Scots' attempt to
humanize the state.
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In Scotland's case, nationalism is in some respects
extreme, such as in the desire of the Scottish National
Party that Scotland be completely separate from England.
There are also the unionist-nationalists, who are associated
with the Conservative Party but still consider themselves
strong advocates of Scotland.^®
Unionist-nationalists equated unionization with
nationalism because they felt it was in the best interests
of Scotland to be a partner in a powerful empire, which
would offer them many economic and social advantages.

These

advantages included trade access to the colonies, peace with
England, greater position within Europe, preservation of
Presbyterianism, preservation of the Scottish legal system,
and avoidance of the restoration of the Stuarts.
Unionist-nationalists believed that Scotland would enter the
union to preserve the best that Scotland had to offer,
economically, socially, legally, and religiously.
Conservative nationalists still exist, pushing not for
devolution, but for more power to be given to the Scottish
Office to resolve economic problems and to provide funding
for more social programs.

However, in the wake of economic

and social problems that have not been sufficiently solved

through union. Conservative numbers have decreased.

An

increasing number of devolutionist-nationalists have
replaced them.

These nationalists are not in favor of

complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom,
just a devolved parliament that would allow them to solve
domestic problems more effectively.^®
Some theorists contend that the quasi-Scottish identity
of the Conservatives caused the decline in Scottish
nationalism and pride.

While Scots were very aware of their

history and the past that had separated them from being
English, they no longer seemed to care about celebrating
their own unique culture or preserving their sovereignty, as
long as there was money to be made from giving up these
qualities.

Economic comfort and satisfaction with funding

of social programs was far more important to the majority of
Scots rather than any ancestral or traditional ties to any
defining cultural features.^®
The other view of Scottish nationalism contends that it
never really existed in the first place.

This school of

theorists contends that speaking a different dialect,
descending from different ancestors, celebrating different
holidays, practicing different religions, and speaking a

64

different language (currently spoken by a minority of the
population in Scotland) were not significant enough
differences to justify the Scots demanding their own
parliament.

The Scots want a parliament to have more

control over their economic programs and to have their own
position in the European Union.

Social program decline,

rising social needs, and cultural differences are not taken
into account by this group of theorists.^"
Consequently, nationalism in Scotland can either be
defined as an instrument to protect Scottish interests or to
establish a separate identity from the English.On the
one hand, some argue that devolution would merely give
Scotland a local government which would consist of people
solely concerned with Scottish issues.

This side does not

believe the threat of separation is realistic.

On the other

hand, devolution would cause the decimation of the entire
United Kingdom.

If Scotland devolves, then Cornwall,

Yorkshire, and other regions who have long complained of
being ignored would have their own local governments as
well.

The demand to devolve by different regions would

cause mass chaos, destroying the unitary state which has
been a part of English culture since William the Conqueror

landed in England in 1066.

With these two very different

views of nationalism, it can be defined differently to fit
the national psychology of the Scots at different periods.
The different views of Scottish nationalism did not unite to
form one view of nationalism supported by a majority of
Scottish people until the mid-1960's.

This was when

Scotland's economic situation became so depressing and so
dismal that the Scots no longer had any faith in their
united government.

Under these conditions, the radical call

of the Scottish nationalists to fight for their own
government and eventual separation from the United Kingdom
inspired a response from the masses.

The SNP's demands did

not seem as foolish or as far-fetched as when Scotland was
economically and domestically prosperous.

The appeal of the

Scottish National Party made sense and offered a solution to
a government that was a failure.
Economics was one of the primary reasons the Act of
Union passed in 1707.

Economics has consistently kept

Scotland in the Union because of the advantages it offered
and has continued to offer.

However, just as economics was

used to moderate nationalism in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, it has been used in modern Scotland to
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awaken nationalism.

With nothing to lose economically, and

everything to gain through profits from the North Sea Oil,
developed agricultural exports, fishing export, and whiskey
exports, the Scots were willing to fight for what they now
perceived as their right as a sovereign nation--the right to
self-determinism.
Consequently, as long as the Scottish economy remained
strong, the middle and upper classes remained prosperous,
and the Scots were allocated the authority through the
Scottish Office to resolve successfully their problems, they
remained content.

Economic prosperity was linked to social

and cultural prosperity, even if it was not their own
culture and their own society on which they were thriving.
Economic despair, conversely, brought about the switch
from nationalist support of the British Parliament to
nationalist support for, at the very minimum, a devolved
government, and at the maximum, a separate country.

The

revival of devolutionist-nationalism restored interest in
Scottish history, Scottish traditions, Scottish music,
Gaelic, Scottish dialect, and everything else Scots have to
be proud of in their culture.

Twentieth century Scots

thrived on being uniquely Scottish.

They listen to their
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own music, glory in their inventors and scientists, revel in
the fact they have one of the best educational systems in
the world, and celebrate their differences in character from
that of their southern neighbor.^®
Economics and nationalism played a distinctive and
important role in making the devolution referendum of 1979 a
necessary action for Scottish economic and nationalist
survival.

However, the referendum failed because of fear of

separation by one group and fear of too little devolved
power by another.

The Scots were unable to reconcile their

different nationalist views in order to resolve their
economic difficulties, and in the end, politics was the
deciding factor.
Political parties who supported devolution could not
put aside their differences to realize their common goal: a
Scottish Parliament.

However, in the eighteen years

following the 1979 referendum Scottish parties, more
specifically the Scottish Labour Party, worked to design a
plan which was agreeable to all the parties, and which would
appeal to the majority of Scots.

The nationalist and

economic conditions of Scotland were finally brought to the
attention of the most powerful party in Scotland at the time
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they were willing to act on it.

After being out of power

for eighteen years, the British Labour Party resolved to
focus on any issues which could insure electoral victory.
After extensive internal reorganization and reevaluation of
party priorities, both sections of the Labour Party finally
concluded that devolution was in the best interests of
Scotland and of the Labour Party.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INFLUENCE OF SCOTTISH POLITICAL PARTIES

Scotland's eventual success in passing the devolution
referendum was due in part to economics and nationalism.
However, it was the political mechanism harnessing these two
elements that made devolution a success.

The referendum's

successful passage was due to the Labour Party's recognition
of Scotland's economic, domestic, and nationalistic needs.
The Labour Party openly participated in the Scottish
Constitutional Convention to draft a devolution plan which
would satisfy the majority of political needs of the Liberal
Party, the SNP, as well as their own needs.

After seventeen

years of negotiating and compromising, as well as its own
internal reorganization and platform changes, the British
Labour Party was ready to play an active role in
devolution.^
Under the leadership of Tony Blair, the "New Labour
Party" was eager to endorse devolution officially by adding
it to its campaign to win the 1997 election.^

Up until the

1990's, Labour went through the motions of supporting
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devolution because of its earlier commitment to it.

The

Party also went through the motions of supporting devolution
to avoid the loss of voter support to the SNP.

However, the

reorganization of the Party attracted members who gave their
full and sincere support to devolution/
Increased support within the Labour Party for
devolution decreased the fractionalization within the Party,
eliminating one of the primary factors which caused the
failure of the 1997 referendum.

A strong, united Labour

Party needed a comprehensive devolution plan to illustrate
their commitment to giving Scotland the power to deal
effectively with its domestic affairs.

The Labour Party

drew attention away from the argument that devolution leads
to separatism by asserting that devolution is necessary for
the preservation of the United Kingdom.

Giving the Scots

the authority to handle effectively and efficiently their
domestic affairs, as well as the power of taxation relieves
the burden from that of the British Parliaments whose
mediocre efforts have been unable to meet their demands.^
Devolution has taken a long time to come to fruition,
and it is important to understand the economic and
nationalistic influences which eventually sparked a reaction
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from the most powerful party in Scotland and England.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine theories for
centralization and decentralization, the politics involved
in the Act of Union, and the early and recent devolution
movement.

By examining the events preceding the success of

the 1997 referendum, the correlation between the success of
the referendum and the support of the Labour Party will be
apparent.

A Political Theory for Centralization and Decentralization

Political theorists, such as Mark Rouseau and Raphael
Zarinski postulate that a strong central power is necessary
to preserve or to improve economic, social and political
institutions.

A strong central government takes control

from local governments, making political, economic and
social decisions for it.

A central government limits

citizen participation in the governmental process, setting
the parameters for all the citizens inhabiting the state.
All situations and conditions of all areas within a state
are under the control of the central government.

As a

result, lack of participation and control at the local level
is usually found acceptable by a state's citizens until
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their social and economic conditions are no longer
efficiently and effectively met by the central government.^
Rouseau and Zarinski also postulate that once a state
has reached a level of technological advancement, economic
achievement, and social cleavages, the state begins to
demonstrate its lack of power to fulfill effectively the
needs of its citizens.

The citizens within the state begin

to believe that their needs would be better met by a
stronger local government.

This reaction is fueled by fear

and resentment of several existing factors.

Some of these

factors are military aggression, higher taxes, bureaucratic
encroachments, fear of economic stagnation, cultural
extinction, and enforced uniformity.

Rouseau and Zarinski

concluded that it is necessary to decentralize to meet the
needs of complex, industrial or postindustrial societies.^
Decentralization, whether in the form of federalism or
devolution, has to some extent acquired the "halo of
efficiency" once attributed to the central government.
Certain forms of decentralization allow for more citizen
control over policy issues that relate to their vital
interests, enhancing the communication between the local
government and its citizens.

In Scotland's case, devolution
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was viewed as a necessary adjustment to control its
postindustrial society.^
Advancements and change within the welfare state have
made its citizens more demanding of the services the state
promised them.

As a part of an advanced welfare state,

Scotland's citizens demanded more from the Scottish Office.
Hindered by a lack of political power, as well as the
funding that goes with it, the Scottish Office struggled to
meet the needs of the Scots.

The failure to meet these

needs resulted in an increased resentment of the British
Parliament and a demand for more local authority.®

The Politics of the Union of 17 07

Though it has been disputed whether the Scottish masses
wanted the Union, or if it occurred to satisfy the political
desires of the Scottish elites, it is an indisputable fact
that union was not voted on by the masses.

It was a

political decision made by Scottish politicians and
merchants who stood to prosper from the Union.

A union

between Scotland and England promised economic connections
for Scottish elites, as well as eventual social programs
which would be beneficial for the masses.

In most respects.
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the Union was able to fulfill these two requirements for a
period of time with very little to no political
interaction.^
Politically, the Scottish elites were willing to
sacrifice representation in a governing body for
technological advancement, economic prosperity, and national
unity.

While unity resulted in culturally and economically

disturbing events, such as the highland clearances and the
banning of the weaving of traditional clan tartans and
kilts, the union was also beneficial for Scotland.®
Technological advancements, the development of heavy
industries, international trade, a strong united military,
and a dominating, imperial force were the benefits Scots
realized from the union.

These developments were the

catalysts for a strong union, persuading the Scots to accept
not only the Union, but also to believe union essential for
the economic and social prosperity of Scotland.

However,

some of these catalysts also led to a need for devolved
power from the central governments to the local
governments.®
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The Political Catalysts of Devolution

The devolution movement regained power in the late
1880's.

Economic decline, ineffective social program

management and a rebirth of Scottish nationalism awakened
the resentment of English dominance which had lain dormant
for years.

Thus, the Scots began to favor a form of

government which would address its domestic problems more
effectively and efficiently.

A local government given the

power to handle taxes, education, and social programs would
eliminate the red tape represented by a plethora of
jurisdictionally overlapping agencies working against each
other to maintain control of local institutions.

By

devolving, Scotland would eliminate the overlap of agencies
and powers within the Parliament, thus eliminating the
barriers preventing the resolution of troublesome and
controversial issues, domestic issues, and local concerns.^®
Scotland's representation in the British Parliament was
its only significant role in its national government.
Scotland's representation consisted solely of the members
elected to the House of Commons and those fulfilling their
role in the House of Lords in the British Parliament.

In

the beginning of the Union, England's lack of attention to

78

Scottish affairs did not bother the leaders in local
politics as long as they were given the authority to handle
their domestic affairs.

As local politics became more

complex and the economic and social condition of Scotland
became more demanding, the British Parliament met fewer of
Scotland's domestic needs.
Upon uniting in 1707, Scotland's representation in the
British Parliament was a one-sided compromise, with Scotland
winning the right to forty-five seats in the House of
Commons, and sixteen representative Lords.

Originally, the

Scots had requested fifty seats in the House of Commons,
while the English had offered thirty-eight.

Scotland's

representation in the House of Commons, in comparison to the
five hundred and fifty-eight plus members representing
England in the House of Commons, was disproportional and
unfair.

Their limited representation gave them little

voice, which no one heard or cared about in the large
assembly.
There were limitations other than the lack of
proportional membership.

One such limitation was that the

House of Commons controlled bills which the Scottish Grand
Committee reviewed for passage.

Another limitation placed
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on the Scottish representation was that it only required ten
members of the English representation of the Parliament to
veto any bills which were to be put before the Scottish
Grand Committee, and six members of parliament could amend
any aspect of a Scottish bill which they felt was
necessary/^

With so many limitations placed on bills which

involved Scotland, frustration with the Parliament and the
lack of authority over Scottish affairs mounted.
Scotland's political situation had become unbearable,
lacking accountability and effectiveness.

It became

apparent to the masses that a more local and adequate
structure of government was needed for Scotland, since the
current arrangement for handling Scottish business, both at
the executive and the parliamentary level, were now highly
unsatisfactory.

Thus, devolution had become an exigency to

change the current lack of accountability as well as to
improve the social and economic situation of Scotland.

It

had become essential in order to resolve economic and social
problems in Scotland, just as a strong central government
was at one time perceived necessary for the economic and
social prosperity of Scotland.^®

There is little dispute over the idea that the Union
originally brought political stability and economic progress
to Scotland, and the idea of political stability eventually
brought about its acceptance by the Scots.

Yet, even though

the union had been accepted, there remained in Scotland "a
persistent sense of loss, and a perennial sense of outrage
at English condensation.This resentment grew when
foreigners began calling Scotland "North Britain."

The

Scots had been willing to ignore this slur, as long as their
economic and domestic needs were being met by the Scottish
Office.

However, as Scotland's economic and social

conditions changed, the previously dormant political parties
reacted to the declining state of Scotland.

The Early Devolution Movement

Upon unification, there were basically two parties
representing Scotland's interests in the British Parliament.
The Conservative Party were strong advocates of the United
Kingdom and Scotland's continuing successful economic,
social, and political relationship with England.

The

Liberal Party's platform consisted of strong labor rights,
continued success in industry, and a strong Scottish
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identity, which was preserved through Scotland's retention
of its separate legal and administrative system.

Retention

of these systems meant that institutions such as the poor
law, the education system, and the Church remained intact.^®
The Scottish Liberal Party favored federalism, believing
that decentralized power would benefit the United Kingdom,
but was later persuaded to support devolution.^®
The Labour Party, which during the twentieth century
became known as Scotland's Party, was established in the
latter part of the nineteenth century.

Initially, the

Labour Party did not favor any form of decentralized power
from the central government.

It advocated strong Scottish

labor, trade and social programs in order to take care of
Scottish national and international interests.

Preserving a

strong sense of identity through strong social programs was
the Labour Party's method of maintaining nationalism and
some semblance of control over Scottish affairs.

These

strong domestic programs and efficient management of
domestic affairs made devolution and federalism seem an
illogical position for Labour to take in the political
realm.
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Economic decline, a decline in national identity, and
failure to manage effectively domestic needs with authority
given to the Scottish Office led to Scotland's first serious
push for Home Rule in 1886.

The first political nationalist

movement was instigated by the Scottish Home Rule
Association.

It did not focus on the injustice of British

rule after the fashion of the Parnellites of Northern
Ireland, but the legislative neglect of Scotland, and the
need to reform licensing laws, as well as land, game, and
fishery laws.^^
This first movement for Home Rule, which involved
transferring power from the British Parliament to a Scottish
Parliam.ent, failed in 1886.

Thirteen more proposals for

Scottish Home Rule were brought before the House of Commons
between 1890 and 1914.

Home Rule was accepted on principle

by the House of Commons on eight occasions and secured the
support of a majority of the Scottish Members of Parliament
on eleven occasions.Yet, even with this support, none of
the Bills was successful in reaching the Committee stage.
The lack of initiative behind Scottish bills reflected the
low priority attached to Scottish Home rule.

However, it

made the Labour Party aware of a powerful movement which
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placed the economic and national prosperity of Scotland
above the prosperity of the United Kingdom.
Economic depression and the rebirth of nationalism
triggered a reaction within a great many influential Scots
as well as common Scots.

Consequently, Labour's position

was threatened when former Labour member John MacCormick
established the Scottish National Party in 1934. The
Scottish National Party (SNP) did not have a large following
in the beginning.

Economic decline during the 1950's

increased its membership, and by the mid-1950's, it had won
five percent of the Scottish vote.

Its belief that Scotland

should be given the right to govern itself was appealing to
many Scots who believed they were being ignored by the
British Parliament.^''
The authority of the British Parliament may at one time
have represented increased industrialization, advancements
in technology, and beneficial social programs; however, as
present devolution models illustrate, the welfare state
built through these advancements led to greater expectations
of the government from the people.

Without greater

authority given to the local governing body, the Scottish
Office was unable to meet the needs of the people. The
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number of people who were disgruntled with the lack of local
government by the British Parliament increased and the
ideology of the SNP began to appear rational rather than
ridiculous.
The SNP gradually grew in numbers and became more
organized and better funded as a result of the inadequacies
of the British Parliament.

Still, even with the increasing

number of Scots turning to the SNP in the 1960's, the Labour
Party did not percieve them as a serious threat to their
position in Scottish politics until the 1970's. The
culmination of incredible unemployment in old industries, a
rebirth of Scottish identity, and the hope that the
discovery of oil in the North Sea that would rebuild the
Scottish economy inspired the SNP.

Encouraged by the

enthusiasm and hope of their supporters, the SNP was
compelled to push for, at the very minimum, a Scottish
Parliament, and, at the most, complete separation from the
United Kingdom.

Having their own parliament appealed to the

majority of Scots, but the idea of separation was a threat
to many.
The focal point of the SNP's campaign for separation
from the United Kingdom was the North Sea oil.

According to
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these nationalists, the oil was Scotland's oil, and the
profits accrued from it should be used to support
Scotland.With oil as a viable economic source, Scotland
could be independent from the United Kingdom.

The SNP

promised that with separation, Scotland would be far better
off than if it were united with England.

They would have

complete control over their own taxes on goods and services,
control over their money, their own parliament to make
effective decisions regarding domestic problems, and their
own national identity in the world affairs, more
specifically, the European Union.
The increased support the SNP was getting for its plan
to separate from the Union and its increased credibility as
a party were due to the poor economic conditions which were
to be resolved by the North Sea oil.
support alarmed the Labour Party.

This increase in

To counteract the success

of the SNP, as well as to appease the voting Scots, the
Labour Party was the last party, other than the Conservative
Party, to add devolution to its platform in the mid1970 ' s
The three most powerful parties in Scotland in the
1970's advocated some form of devolved power.

The Scottish

86

Liberals' platform was similar to that of the Labour
Party's.

It differed in that the Liberals preferred

federalism over devolution because they felt devolution was
too limited.^"

The SNP favored complete separation of

Scotland from the United Kingdom, but the less radical
members were willing to work towards the more realistic goal
of attaining their own parliament.

The Labour Party

attempted to assuage any fears of separation occurring by
strongly stating that its devolution plan did not support
devolution and that it was only in favor of devolving power
to a Scottish Parliament.
The parties all agreed there needed to be some form of
devolved power which would give Scotland the means necessary
to resolve its domestic affairs.

Differences in the types

and degree of power which would be given to Scotland, as
well as the threat of devolution leading to complete
separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, were
barriers which proved to be detrimental to the devolution
referendum at the time the vote failed in 1979.^^
Disagreements with the devolution plan put before the
Scottish people for passage in 1979 were significant enough
to defeat the referendum.

Severe fractions within the

Labour Party, who was responsible for drafting and
introducing the bill voted upon, were the cause for several
restrictions to be placed on the bill which had adverse
effects on its passage.

One such restriction was the need

for forty percent of the voting population to vote in favor
of devolution for the referendum to become law.

By placing

this restriction on the bill, all abstainers and all people
voting no, either because they were actually opposed to
devolution or because they wanted more powers given to the
Scottish Parliament, were setting the referendum up for
failure.

Also, there was some controversy over whose votes

actually should be counted and those who should not have
been counted.

There is still a question of whether the

referendum was lost by a two percent margin or an eight
percent margin.
The lack of cohesion on the part of the Labour Party,
as well as a lack of consensus on the devolution plan among
the parties who favored it all contributed to the
referendum's failure.

This failure did not abolish

devolution from any of these parties' platforms.

Instead,

the referendum's controversial failure insured that
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devolution would be an issue for future discussion,
planning, and development.^^

The New Devolution Movement

Labour lost power after the failure of the devolution
referendum and was replaced by the Conservative Thatcher
government.

Undeterred by the failure, committed

devolutionists formed the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly
(CSA) in March 1980.^^

The sole goal of this organization

of individuals and affiliated bodies was the creation of a
directly elected legislative assembly for Scotland.
Administrative devolution had been occurring for years, but
had proved to be ineffective without the support of a
legislative assembly.^®

The CSA attracted support from

across the political spectrum, and in 1981, the CSA
published a "Blueprint for Scotland.
This plan emphasized the need to achieve a broad
consensus behind an Assembly scheme, as well as making
reference to the United Nations Charter in proclaiming the
right of Scotland to have their own parliament.

The CSA

also determined Scotland had the rights of a nation, and
therefore should be able to determine its own political
future.

The CSA continued its policy of passive, uninspired

lobbying.

It continued to draw praise for its persistent

efforts, but in reality they achieved very little.^®
Frustrated with its lack of success, the CSA called for
the establishment of a Constitutional Convention.
Established in 1985, the Constitutional Convention would be
composed of elected or delegated members to draw up an
Assembly scheme, turn it into a Bill, and present it to
Parliament as the democratically expressed wishes of the
Scottish people.^'
This ambitious proposal was met with a mixed reaction
from the parties, with Labour's being the most pronounced.
The Labour Party had always maintained a careful distance
from the CSA.

Their official position in the summer of 1986

regarding the CSA was that a Constitutional Convention was
unnecessary because Labour was going to win the next
election.

Electoral victory would firmly commit to

establishing a Scottish Assembly.^"
However, Labour lost the 1987 election, and the CSA
established a Constitutional Steering Committee chaired by
Professor Sir Robert Grieve.

Professor Grieve, a

distinguished former chairman of the Highlands and Islands
Development Board, and Jim Ross, the secretary of the
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committee, co-authored the report for the committee.
Published in 1988, "A Claim of Right for Scotland" referred
to the two previous Claims of Right which the Scots issued
against mis-government in 1689 and 1842.
established a third Claim of Right:

The report also

Scotland had the right

to declare directly its demands and grievances rather than
have them articulated for them by a government utterly
unrepresentative of Scots.

The Claim's goals were to draw

up a scheme for a Scottish assembly, mobilizing Scottish
opinion behind the scheme, and persuading the government to
approve the scheme or an acceptable modification of it.^^
This uncompromising position on Scotland's status as a
nation was not protected by the "British" Constitution, and
the Scots were compelled to take matters into their own
hands.

Once again, a Constitutional Convention was

suggested, and this time it was established with the support
of the SNP, the Scottish Trade Union Congress, the
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, and all the
Scottish Churches.More importantly, the Labour Party was
compelled to swallow its doubts and participate in the
Constitutional Convention to prevent its exploitation by the
SNP."
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Labour, due to its larger membership, quickly became
the stronger of the two parties.

Feuds between the SNP

leadership and the Labour leadership finally resulted in the
withdrawal of the leadership of the SNP.

Many members of

the SNP remained in the Convention and in support of
devolution, but the official position of the SNP was that it
no longer supported devolution.
Having launched a successful "Independence in Europe
Campaign," which overturned a large Labour majority to win
the seat, the SNP believed their supporters would leave the
Convention and follow them in their fight for separation.
However, this was too radical a move for those in favor of
devolution, and the SNP lost support to the Convention.
Yet, it was not a complete loss.

The SNP had managed to

open the eyes of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party,
convincing them that there was definitely a need for
Scotland to have its own elected assembly with its own
powers.
During the years between its establishment in 1988 and
the 1992 general election, the Convention held a series of
meetings to discuss the details of a plan for a devolved
government.

Deadlines for publication of a plan for
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devolution were pushed back, which eventually began to raise
the suspicions of many:

had the Convention become a

stalling device rather than a force for devolution?^®

While

it is true that the Convention kept launching and
relaunching what seemed to be the same proposals, they were
in fact dealing with some difficult issues which took a
great deal of effort and compromise to resolve.

Tax-power

issues, proportional representation, and gender
representation were issues which took some time to resolve
in the devolution plan.^^
In addition to difficult issues. Labour lost ,focus and
stepped back from political devolution, contending that
there were more pressing issues on which to focus.

It was

apparent that the Convention had lost momentum, and it was
necessary for the Convention delegates to regroup and regain
their focus.

The need for resolution of these issues

escalated when the "New Labour Party," which had undergone
internal policy and organizational change, recognized the
support for devolution in Scotland and Wales.

Seeking to

win the 1997 election. Labour's leader, Tony Blair,
persuaded his party to support the efforts of the
Convention.
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Convinced that devolution would be key in the 1997
campaign, Labour worked hard to organize the other delegates
of the Convention.

They pushed the other delegates from

other parties and organizations, such as teachers' groups
and civil servants' groups, to make decisions on issues
which had hindered agreement for a devolution referendum in
the past.®°
However, even though Labour managed to rejuvenate the
Convention, it faced other difficulties.

The Conservative

Party, though weakened, was adamantly opposed to devolution.
John Major denounced devolution as the worst possible threat
in modern history, claiming it would lead to the
disintegration of the United Kingdom, or at the very
minimum, breeding an atmosphere of discontent.

Discontent

would lead to English regions clamoring for their own
regional assemblies, and this would lead to utter chaos.
With these considerations in mind, the Convention had
to draft a devolution plan which would clearly outline the
powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament, as
well as firmly stating that devolution would not lead to
separatism.

Devolution by definition will not lead to

separatism, but another great concern was the Scottish
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Parliament having the power to raise taxes.

After much

debate within the Convention, it was determined that the
devolution referendum would ask two questions.

The first

question was whether Scotland should have its own
parliament, and the other was whether it should have the
right to raise taxes.
With these two considerations in mind, the Convention
released The White Papers in July 1997.

This document

outlined the role of the Scottish Parliament, and all the
matters over which it would have legislative power.

The

Scottish Parliament would have general responsibility for
the National Health Service in Scotland as well as
responsibility for public and mental health.

It would also

be responsible for the education and training of health
professionals and the terms and conditions of service of NHS
staff and general practitioners.

Also, school education,

including pre-five year-olds, primary and secondary
education, the functions of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Schools and teacher supply, as well as the training and
conditions of service were to fall under the jurisdiction of
the Scottish Parliament.

The Scottish Parliament would also

be in control of higher education, including policy.
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funding, the functions of the Scottish Higher Education
Funding Council, and student grants.

Other facets of

education with which the Scottish Parliament would be
involved were science and research funding, training policy
and lifelong learning, vocational qualifications, and
careers advice guidance.
The Scottish Parliament would also be responsible for
local government, including local government finance and
local domestic and non-domestic taxation, social programs,
housing, and land-use planning and building control.

It

would also be responsible for economic development,
financial assistance to industry, internal investment, trade
and exports, tourism, and air and sea transport.
Laws and home affairs, such as criminal, civil, and
electorate laws, judicial appointments, courts, tribunals,
legal aid, parole, prisons, liquor licensing, and other
domestic affairs would fall under the responsibilities of
the new parliament.

Other responsibilities included

environmental concerns, agricultural, forestry and fishing
regulations, sport and the arts, as well as registration and
records.
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All the responsibilities the Scottish Parliament would
assume were recorded in the White Papers, which were then
approved by the British Parliament and deemed ready for the
people's vote.

On September 12, 1997, seventy-four point

two percent supported the bid for a Scottish Parliament, and
sixty-three point four percent supported limited tax-raising
powers for the Scottish Parliament.

Labour had managed to

pass the devolution referendum, and Scotland's Parliament
was scheduled to be functioning by January 1999.^^

The

Scots had finally been given the right to govern themselves
after relinquishing this right 290 years earlier.
There are still more decisions and preparations to be
made.

For example, who will become the first prime minister

of the Scottish parliament?

Where in Edinburgh will the

Scottish Parliament hold their sessions? How will
representatives from each district be elected?

Scotland

will have its own people from its own parties making these
decisions for it.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

A Scottish Parliament has finally become a reality
through the efforts of the Labour Party.

Without Labour's

agreement to support fully devolution, it is unlikely
Scotland would be preparing for its Parliament in 1999.
Devolution was a political movement manipulated by the
British Labour Party to win the 1997 election.

Economics

and nationalism played an important part in devolution's
success, but it would be a naive assumption to cite them as
the primary reasons for the devolution referendum's success
in 1997.

The British Labour Party was very aware that they

needed to recapture the support and credibility the Scottish
National Party had managed to accrue over the past three
decades in order to win Scotland's support in the 1997
election.
Along with acknowledging the SNP as their main
opponent, the British Labour Party also realized that
Scotland's domestic affairs were not being given the
attention needed to resolve successfully these issues. The
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Party also recognized that the economic situation in
conjunction with the rebirth in nationalism needed to
addressed.

The Party ignored explosive catalysts, such as

economic decline and a rise in nationalism, which had only
added to the support of the Scottish Nationalists.

The

Party was forced the consider the increased support of the
SNP as a threat to their power in Scotland.
Finally, the Labour Party had been completely
reorganized by Tony Blair.

All of these factors changed the

feelings of the Labour Party from merely a token show of
support for Scottish devolution to all-out support of a
movement which would prove necessary for providing the Scots
the means to resolve domestic problems, as well as to
preserve the United Kingdom from the disintegrating
influences of the Scottish National Party.

These factors

have been the primary forces for the devolution movement
within Scotland.

However, history, economic and social

decline, as well as devolution theory, have also played an
important role in Scotland's battle for its own parliament.
Historically, Scotland has been a country which has had
a long history of fighting for independence from the
English, as well as a history of turbulent relationships
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among their clans.

Fighting for freedom from the English

was a uniting factor for years, but many times has proved
insufficient as a unifying force.

The reasons for remaining

unified against England became less and less compelling.
Economic prosperity for the political elites, along with the
promise of social improvement became more important than
unity, and the Scots became less concerned with maintaining
their national identity.
The inferiority complex of the Scottish elites was a
commanding force behind the need for the anglicization of
the Scots.

These elites perceived the English to be

superior to them in culture, society, and economics.

As a

result, Scots buried their previously strong feelings of
nationalism and capitulated under the force of
anglicization.

Even though they retained their legal

system, their court system, and their education system,
other aspects of Scottish culture changed.

The

manufacturing of traditional dress was outlawed, Scottish
literary figures were dismissed as inadequate rather than
celebrated, and the native language of the Scots, Gaelic,
was no longer taught in school.
change the Scots.

These all combined to
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Economically, the Scots no longer were an agriculturalbased society.

With the Highland Clearances in the 1800's,

small acreage farmers were forced to work in the cities.
They were employed in steel mills, on fishing boats, in
woolen mills, in mass manufacturing, and other industries.
These industries brought prosperity for the Scots, but also
were a disappointment when they led to environmental damage
and economic depression when they were no longer in demand.
The early twentieth century saw the first severe decline in
heavy industry in Scotland.

Steel mills closed down, and

mass manufacturing of goods suffered.

The advent of World

Wars I and II rejuvenated these industries because of the
need for steel products, but at the end of the second world
war, their industries went into severe decline once more.
It was estimated in the 1950's that thousands of jobs were
lost when mills closed.

With unemployment high, and the

Scottish Office lacking the power to aid Scotland's economic
decline, people were upset with the lack of accountability
and attention of the British Parliament to their situation.
This feeling of helplessness gave the Scottish National
Party the support they needed to begin winning seats in
Parliament.

The SNP's increased popularity, along with the
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discovery of oil in the North Sea, caused the Labour Party
to take a position on devolution instead of merely opposing
it or ignoring it.

Consequently, when the push for

devolution was at its strongest, the Labour Party half
heartedly threw its lot in with the devolutionists.

The oil

crisis and party fractionalization proved too difficult for
advocates of devolution to overcome.

As a result, the 1979

devolution referendum was lost due to the fractionalization
of the Labour party and the economic instability caused by
the oil crisis.
Though frustrated, devolutionists worked hard to keep
home rule on the political agenda.

Unfortunately,

devolution was placed on Labour's less urgent issues list.
Yet, devolutionists were not defeated, and formed the
Constitutional Convention in the early 1980's to formulate a
better devolution plan.

The experience of Thatcherism

compelled many Scots to support devolution.

Treated as

guinea pigs for Thatcher's new schemes and having their
needs ignored by Thatcher's government, the Scots began to
believe that devolution was the only way in which to gain
the power to resolve their domestic problems.
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A revised devolution plan and a reorganized Labour
Party to handle more effectively the problems of Scotland in
the 1990's led to the official endorsement of Scottish
devolution by the British Labour Party.

With the full

support of the largest party in Scotland, the Constitutional
Convention was able to resolve the conflicts delaying the
presentation of another plan to the British Parliament.

The

Parliament agreed to allow the devolution plan to be put
before the people for a vote on September 12, 1997, where it
was passed by a large majority.

It was obvious that the

people of Scotland were willing to take on a huge political
responsibility by once again having their own parliament.
Scottish devolution is a case among many cases existing
in Western and Eastern Europe and Asia.

It differs in that

it was not a reaction to violence existing between ethnic
groups, but because it was a peaceful recognition of
national and economic problems which could better be
resolved by a stronger local government.
In general, the main fear attached to devolution is
that it would eventually lead to separation rather than a
stronger union between the United Kingdom and Scotland.
Devolutionists counter this fear by positing that devolution
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by definition is the transferal of authority from a central
power to a local government to preserve and strengthen
unions rather than destroy them.

In Spain, Sri Lanka,

Russia, and other countries who are in the process of
(

devolving, devolution was necessary to preserve their
national governments and to preserve peace.

Economic and

nationalistic needs of these countries made it necessary for
them to have the authority to handle them.

Outbreaks of

violence and protests in these countries increased the
tension between ethnic groups in the nation-state.

Meeting

the sovereign demands of self-determination of the nationstate is necessary, and devolution is the means to realize
this.
Devolution is a healthy solution to political and
social growth, economic and political change, economic
stagnation, or economic and social decline.

Transferring

authority from the central power to the local power is
necessary to resolve the domestic problems of Scotland and
to preserve and strengthen the union.

With devolution being

an acceptable means of resolving conflicts within a nation,
the Labour Party's support of devolution was perceived as
rational and necessary.

Though it is difficult to determine
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if the Scottish Parliament will be more successful in
handling Scottish affairs than the British Parliament, it is
evident that devolution has proven to be an effective way of
resolving conflicts within the nation-state.
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